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States’ and nations’ laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum, and judgments
from other jurisdictions can create problems with personal jurisdiction,
choice of law, and the recognition of foreign judgments. This article
reviews Texas conflict cases from Texas state and federal courts during
the Survey period from December 1, 2015, through November 30, 2016.
The article excludes cases involving federal–state conflicts; intrastate
issues, such as subject matter jurisdiction and venue; and conflicts in time,
such as the applicability of prior or subsequent law within a state. State
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and federal cases are discussed together because conflict of laws is mostly
a state-law topic, except for a few constitutional limits, resulting in the
same rules applying to most issues in state and federal courts.1
Although no data are readily available to confirm this, Texas is no
doubt a primary state in the production of conflict-of-laws precedents.
This results not only from its size and population, but also from its
placement bordering four states and a civil-law nation, and its significant
international trade volume. Texas state and federal courts provide a
fascinating study of conflicts issues every year, but the volume of case law
now greatly exceeds this Survey’s ability to report on them, a function
both of journal space and authors’ time. In addition, the current Survey
covers one year and will accordingly limit its review to a few highlight
cases and an examination of a couple of trends.
I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may be
established by consent (usually based on a contract’s forum-selection
clause), waiver (failing to make a timely objection), or extraterritorial
service of process under a Texas long-arm statute. Because most aspects
of notice are purely matters of forum law, this article will focus primarily
on the issues relating to amenability.
Perhaps sensing a need for some fine-tuning in response to recent U.S.
Supreme Court cases, both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
and the Texas Supreme Court issued significant personal-jurisdiction de-
cisions in 2016. These new opinions—every one of which has a transna-
tional angle—also reflect the ever-growing impact of globalization on
U.S. litigation.
A. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
In International Energy Ventures Management, L.L.C. v. United Energy
Group, Ltd., a consultant brought an action in Texas state court against a
broker, Sean Mueller, and a Chinese oil company, United Energy Group
(UEG), seeking fees allegedly owed to it for assisting UEG in its
purchase of BP’s assets in Pakistan.2 After removal, the district court de-
nied International Energy Ventures Management’s (IEVM) motion to re-
mand, dismissed the claims against Mueller for failure to state a claim,
and dismissed the claims against UEG based on lack of personal
jurisdiction.3
1. For a thorough discussion of the choice-of-law function in federal courts, see
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 722–72 (6th ed. 2010).
2. Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193,
198 (5th Cir. 2016). Although it is not relevant to the jurisdictional discussion, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that federal, rather than state, pleading stan-
dards apply when determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim against a nondiverse
defendant, thereby abrogating a line of cases holding to the contrary.
3. Id. at 199.
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IEVM alleged a right to recover “under an unwritten agreement that
UEG would pay IEVM for its consulting services on the BP deal.”4
[A]fter that deal closed, IEVM performed services for UEG under a
supplemental [written] agreement. In that agreement, UEG acknowl-
edged IEVM’s previous services and that UEG had not yet paid
IEVM for those services. . . . In consideration for further IEVM ser-
vices, UEG agreed to pay IEVM . . . . It also agreed to release IEVM
from, and indemnify it for, any liability arising out of the BP deal.5
The supplemental agreement provided for the application of Texas law
and arbitration in Texas. “It included a merger clause, but noted that it
‘does not supersede, but is a supplement to, the agreement with respect
to the prior work completed by [IEVM] for UEG.’”6
These facts raise two personal jurisdiction questions. First, should the
written supplemental agreement extend to the original, unwritten agree-
ment, and, if so, does the arbitration provision constitute implied consent
to jurisdiction in Texas for claims under the original agreement? Second,
are UEG’s contacts with Texas so substantial that an exercise of personal
jurisdiction over it would comport with traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice?
With respect to the first question, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found no need to conduct an ambiguity analysis because—
even assuming that the written agreement supplemented the unwritten
agreement—there was no consent to Texas jurisdiction.7 This is so be-
cause an arbitration clause confers only limited jurisdiction:
“When a party agrees to arbitrate in a particular state, via explicit or
implicit consent, the district courts of the agreed-upon state may ex-
ercise personal jurisdiction over the parties for the limited purpose
of compelling arbitration.” Thus, UEG’s agreement to arbitrate in
Texas does not necessarily constitute consent to the personal jurisdic-
tion of Texas courts to adjudicate its claims in the first instance.8
The Fifth Circuit made equally short work of IEVM’s “contacts” argu-
ment. There was apparently no dispute that UEG had contacts with
Texas. In fact, it had hired agents in Texas (including IEVM), sent princi-
pals to Texas to close the BP deal, and entered into the supplemental
agreement, which contained a Texas choice-of-law clause. But these con-
tacts, in the Fifth Circuit’s view, did not constitute minimum contacts be-
cause they bore an insufficient nexus to “‘the relationship among the
[UEG], the forum, and the litigation’ over the unwritten, original agree-
ment between UEG and IEVM.”9 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found
that
4. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 210–11 (emphasis added).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 211–12.
8. Id. at 212 (citation omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. Assocs. Int’l Holdings Corp.,
242 F. App’x 955, 957 (5th Cir. 2007)).
9. Id. at 213 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014)).
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UEG had no presence in Texas as a result of the unwritten, original
agreement because (1) UEG did not negotiate the agreement in
Texas, (2) UEG did not travel to Texas because of that agreement,
and (3) the unwritten agreement did not require performance in
Texas. Instead, the unwritten, original agreement was between Chi-
nese and Texas entities regarding services performed in Pakistan.
That IEVM happened to provide those consulting services from
Texas is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction.10
This is perhaps the most thinly argued part of the holding: it’s no great
stretch to frame IEVM’s claim not just as a suit on the original agreement
but as a suit on the subsequent acknowledgement of the debt. Of course
that claim might ultimately fail as a matter of contract law, but that’s not
a threshold question.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also decided a general
jurisdiction case, Patterson v. Aker Solutions Inc., that effectively shuts
the door on that jurisdictional theory unless the target defendant’s princi-
pal place of business or place of incorporation is a meaningful contact
with the forum.11 In that case, Patterson, a U.S. citizen, was injured while
working on a project “aboard the M/V SIMON STEVIN, a Luxembourg-
flagged vessel that was located off the coast of Russia.”12 Patterson’s em-
ployer was Blue Offshore Projects BV (Blue Offshore), but he also sued
Aker Solutions, Inc. (Aker Solutions), Aker Subsea, FMC Technologies,
Inc., FMC Kongsberg Subsea AS, and FMC Eurasia, LLC. The district
court dismissed Aker Subsea for lack of personal jurisdiction.
On appeal from a severed final judgment, Patterson argued that—by
virtue of eleven secondment agreements with a U.S. affiliate—Aker Sub-
sea had sufficient contacts with the United States to establish general per-
sonal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). In light
of recent U.S. Supreme Court pronouncements, the Fifth Circuit noted
that for general jurisdiction to attach, “Aker Subsea’s contacts with the
United States must be so continuous and systematic as to render it essen-
tially at home in the United States.”13 As a general matter, a corporation
may be fairly regarded at home only in its principal place of business or
place of incorporation, and here, on both counts Aker Subsea’s locus was
Norway. In the face of these facts, general jurisdiction could be estab-
lished only in an “exceptional case.”14
10. Id.
11. Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2016).
12. Id. at 233.
13. Id. at 234 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014)). The Fifth
Circuit quoted the following language from Daimler:
[T]he inquiry under [Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed.2d 796 (2011)] is not whether a
foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense “con-
tinuous and systematic,” it is whether that corporation’s “affiliations with the
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home
in the forum State.”
Id. (alteration in original).
14. Id.
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As a “benchmark,” the Fifth Circuit turned to Perkins v. Benguet Con-
solidated Mining Co.,15 which it characterized as the only modern case in
which the Supreme Court “ha[d] found a sufficient basis for the exercise
of general jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.”16 In that well-
known case, a Philippine corporation, due to World War II, had moved
extensive parts of its operation to Ohio, and on that basis was found sub-
ject to general jurisdiction. By comparison, the Fifth Circuit held that
Aker Subsea’s contacts fall well short of effectively operating its bus-
iness within the United States. At most, Aker Subsea sent eleven of
its employees to the United States when it entered into the second-
ment agreements with its affiliate. These contacts are insufficient to
make Aker Subsea essentially at home in the United States.17
The Fifth Circuit went on to discuss, among other things, two “rare
cases where this court has found general jurisdiction over a foreign defen-
dant,” and was at some pains to distinguish them from the case before
it.18 With respect to these cases, which should now be viewed with deep
suspicion, the Fifth Circuit more-or-less buried the lede (in a footnote):
“Both System Pipe and Adams predate Goodyear and Daimler AG.
Scholars have viewed the Court’s recent personal jurisdiction decisions as
part of an access-restrictive trend.”19
B. TEXAS SUPREME COURT
In Searcy v. Parex Resources, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court was faced
with a “complicated jurisdiction case involv[ing] multiple corporations,
countries, and continents.”20 The supreme court’s own starting place is as
good as any:
Here is the SparkNotes summary. A Bermudian entity was the sole
shareholder of Class A shares of another Bermudian entity that
owns certain Colombian oil and gas operations. The Bermudian
shareholder sought to sell these shares and entered into a share
purchase agreement, negotiated in Texas, with a Texan entity. The
deal fell through, and so the Bermudian shareholder searched for
other buyers. After a Canadian entity pursued the shares, the Texan
entity sued both the Canadian entity and the Bermudian shareholder
in Texas for tortious interference with its share purchase agreement.
The Texan entity also sued the Bermudian owner of the Colombian
oil and gas operations in Texas for fraud.21
15. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
16. Patterson, 826 F.3d at 235.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 236.
19. Id. at 237 n.7 (citing Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in
Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 304 (2013)).
20. Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex. 2016).
21. Id.
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The facts are so convoluted that it makes sense to work backwards
from the supreme court’s holdings. First, when the Canadian entity, Parex
Canada, “sought to purchase shares of a Bermudian entity that owns Co-
lombian assets from a Bermudian shareholder and did not intend to de-
velop a Texas business, it did not purposefully avail itself of Texas’s
jurisdiction.”22 The supreme court deemed Parex Canada’s contacts with
Texas “too fortuitous and attenuated for the exercise of specific jurisdic-
tion.”23 “[E]ven considering the extent of the communications between
[it] and the Bermudian shareholder’s executives in Texas—communica-
tions that were certainly voluminous, and, as is usual these days, elec-
tronic—the Canadian entity had no control over where the employees of
the Bermudian shareholder happened to be located.”24 We’ll return to
this holding in a minute, but the supreme court’s conception of “fortuity”
is in some sense novel. Second, the supreme court held “that Texas courts
have specific—although not general—jurisdiction over the Bermudian
owner of the Colombian oil and gas operations [(Ramshorn)]. The claims
against [Ramshorn] turn on its Texas-based executives’ alleged misrepre-
sentations in Texas to a Texas entity.”25
With respect to its analysis of Parex Canada’s Texas contacts, the su-
preme court had already set up the framework in a discussion of specific
jurisdiction. In that discussion, the supreme court observed that it must
focus on the defendant’s relationship, not the plaintiff’s, to the forum and
that a defendant may structure transactions to “purposely avoid” a partic-
ular forum and its laws. With these principles in mind, the supreme court
interpreted cases like Calder v. Jones26 and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc.27 to mean that a defendant is at risk only if it “continuously and
deliberately exploited the [forum state’s] market.”28 Thus, “[e]ven if a
nonresident defendant knows that the effects of its actions will be felt by
a resident plaintiff, that knowledge alone is insufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident.”29 Something more is required and that
“something” is a “substantial connection” to the forum.30
Once this backdrop was stitched into place, the supreme court moved
to a discussion of what it saw as the controlling facts. Although Parex
Canada seems to have known that the Bermudian seller of Columbian
assets had operations in Texas and had many communications with the
seller’s Houston-based employees, it never sought out a Texas seller or




25. Id. at 62.
26. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
27. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
28. Searcy, 496 S.W.3d at 68 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
780 (1984)).
29. Id. at 69.
30. Id. at 70 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014)).
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in Texas, though voluminous, were not “purposeful” in a jurisdictionally
meaningful sense:
Discussions that focused on acquiring some non-Texan assets are a
far cry from purposeful availment of Texas’s jurisdiction—the
[seller’s] employees involved could, quite literally, have been based
anywhere in the world, and Parex Canada would presumably have
interacted with it in the same way as they did with its employees
here. Parex Canada did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits,
privileges, or profits of engaging with Texas.31
To the contrary, Parex Canada—by inserting New York forum and
choice-of-law clauses in transaction documents and by arranging for its
Bermudian subsidiary to own the shares relating to the Columbian as-
sets—“appears to have purposefully avoided Texas.”32 And the fact that
the plaintiff felt harm in Texas changes nothing because “the alleged di-
rection of a tort into Texas is not a valid basis for specific jurisdiction.”33
With respect to Ramshorn, the supreme court easily found adequate
contacts to support specific personal jurisdiction. Although Ramshorn ar-
gued that an executive of the seller was not its agent, the supreme court
agreed that the trial court had ample evidence to conclude that this exec-
utive “had actual and apparent authority to sell the Ramshorn shares and
. . . actively negotiated their sale in Texas.”34 Indeed,
entanglement between Ramshorn and Nabors supports the trial
court’s holding that it had specific jurisdiction over claims alleging
misrepresentation by the Nabors executive who had the actual power
to control whether Nabors sells the Ramshorn shares—claims which
arise out of the exercise of that power. This sort of close connection
between Ramshorn and Nabors is not random, fortuitous, or attenu-
ated—rather it was all part of a general plan to sell the Ramshorn
shares via talks in Texas, and thus use the Texas forum to make
money.35
In dissent, Justice Guzman sharply disagreed with the majority’s hold-
ing concerning Parex Canada. The gist of the argument is that “Parex
Canada’s contacts with Texas were anything but fortuitous.”36 Particu-
larly troublesome for the dissent was the majority’s disregard of the “re-
peated contacts with Texas to negotiate a share purchase agreement, and
[the fact that] the fallout from those negotiations was directly tied to this
forum.”37 So, at bottom, there remains some theoretical disagreement at
the supreme court as to what kind of Texas contacts are purposeful rather
than fortuitous.
31. Id. at 74–75.
32. Id. at 75.
33. Id. at 76. Without breaking any new ground, the supreme court also rejected asser-
tions of general jurisdiction over either Parex Canada or Ramshorn.
34. Id. at 77.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 79 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
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TV Azteca v. Ruiz presented the Texas Supreme Court with a first-
impression opportunity to examine personal jurisdiction in the context of
alleged defamation originating in a foreign jurisdiction.38 As the supreme
court set forth the background facts,
Mexican recording artist Gloria de Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz, popu-
larly known as Gloria Trevi (and sometimes referred to as “Mexico’s
Madonna”), now lives in Texas. Near the height of Trevino’s fame in
the late 1990s, she was accused of luring underage girls into sexual
relationships with her manager. Authorities arrested Trevino and her
manager in Brazil on charges of sexual assault and kidnapping. Tre-
vino spent nearly five years in prisons in Brazil and Mexico, but a
Mexican judge ultimately found her not guilty and dismissed all
charges in 2004. After her acquittal, Trevino moved to McAllen,
Texas . . . .39
Trevino sued two Mexican television broadcasting companies, TV Az-
teca and Publimax, and a Mexican citizen, Patricia Chapoy, a news
anchor and producer for TV Azteca, alleging that TV Azteca, Publimax,
and Chapoy (referred to in the opinion as Petitioners) “defamed her on
several occasions, primarily in stories [about aspects of her past] on a
television program called Ventaneando, a Spanish-language entertain-
ment news program that TV Azteca produced, Chapoy hosted, and Pub-
limax aired on television stations affiliated with TV Azteca.”40
The supreme court began its jurisdictional analysis with a review of,
most importantly, Calder and Keeton, each of which permitted an exer-
cise of jurisdiction in a media defamation case despite fairly limited physi-
cal contacts to the forum. Trevino advanced four jurisdictional theories,
namely that Petitioners “‘directed a tort’ at Trevino in Texas; broadcast
allegedly defamatory statements in Texas; knew the statements would be
broadcast in Texas; and intentionally targeted Texas through those broad-
casts.”41 The supreme court ultimately held that the first three of these
theories do not establish purposeful availment, but the fourth does.42 We
take each of these in turn.
There was no dispute that Trevino resides in Texas and suffered her
injuries in Texas. But the supreme court had previously, in Michiana Easy
Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten,43 rejected the direct-a-tort test for specific
jurisdiction. As the supreme court observed, “[t]here is a subtle yet cru-
cial difference between directing a tort at an individual who happens to
live in a particular state and directing a tort at that state.”44 Here, “the
fact that the plaintiff lives and was injured in the forum state is not irrele-
38. TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 85
U.S.L.W. 3182 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2016) (No. 16-481).
39. Id. at 35.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 43.
42. See id. at 43–56.
43. 168 S.W.3d 777, 791–92 (Tex. 2005).
44. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d at 43.
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vant to the jurisdictional inquiry, but it is relevant only to the extent that
it shows that the forum state was ‘the focus of the activities of the defen-
dant.’”45 Thus, “the mere fact that Petitioners directed defamatory state-
ments at a plaintiff who lives in and allegedly suffered injuries in Texas,
without more, does not establish specific jurisdiction over Petitioners.”46
There was also no dispute that Petitioners’ broadcasts, which
originated in Mexico, traveled into Texas via the phenomenon known as
“signal spill-over.”47 As a policy matter, the Petitioners urged the su-
preme court to draw a line between broadcast and print publication (the
latter being at issue in Calder and Keeton): “If the ‘over-the-air transmis-
sion of television signals’ constitutes ‘business in Texas,’ they contend,
then every television and radio broadcaster ‘deep in Mexico’ whose signal
reaches over the border is ‘doing business in Texas,’ as is ‘virtually every
out-of-state Internet service provider which operates a website accessible
in Texas.’”48 The supreme court accepted this argument, holding that
broadcast signals straying into Texas are not “purposeful” contacts.49
Trevino next posited that Petitioners knew that their broadcasts would
reach a Texas audience, a fact that they appear to have conceded. Here,
too, the supreme court noted that knowledge and foreseeability—though
not irrelevant to a jurisdictional analysis—are not enough to demonstrate
purposeful availment.50 For authority-by-analogy, the supreme court
turned to its stream-of-commerce precedents, under which mere knowl-
edge that a product may arrive in the forum is insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction.51 Accordingly, “a broadcaster’s mere knowledge
that its programs will be received in another jurisdiction is insufficient to
establish that the broadcaster purposefully availed itself of the benefits of
conducting activities in that jurisdiction.”52 More is required: “[E]vidence
of ‘additional conduct’ must establish that the broadcaster had ‘an intent
or purpose to serve the market in the forum State.’”53
Despite rejection of these three theories, the supreme court acknowl-
edged that Trevino had presented evidence of “additional conduct” that
could demonstrate Petitioners intent to serve the Texas market.54 One
way to establish this intent would be to show that Petitioners “aimed”
their conduct at Texas.55 But to make this showing courts typically re-
quire the subject matter and sources to be in the forum state, a showing
45. Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 44 (describing “signal spill-over” as the “results from the over-the-air signals
‘following the law of physics’”).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 45.
50. Id. at 46.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 46–47 (quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 577
(Tex. 2007)).
54. Id. at 47.
55. Id.
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that Trevino could not make as a factual matter. Nonetheless, the subject-
and-sources test is only one way of demonstrating intent, and Trevino
presented three types of intent evidence:
• “Petitioners actually physically ‘entered into’ Texas to produce and
promote their broadcasts”;56
• “Petitioners derived substantial revenue and other benefits by selling
advertising time to Texas businesses”;57 and
• “Petitioners made substantial and successful efforts to distribute
their programs and increase their popularity in Texas, including the
programs in which they allegedly defamed Trevino.”58
The collective weight of this evidence was sufficient to convince the su-
preme court that Petitioners purposely availed themselves of the Texas
market and that their conduct was sufficiently related to Trevino’s claims
to support personal jurisdiction.59
Petitioners final thrust was against the “fair play” of a U.S. suit against
them. This argument consisted of two strands. First, “Texas has no inter-
est” in suits between Mexican citizens. The supreme court quickly
snapped this thread: “Fundamentally, ‘[a] state has an especial interest in
exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its ter-
ritory,’ and we have never conditioned that interest on the plaintiff’s sta-
tus as a Texas ‘citizen,’ as opposed to a Texas ‘resident.’”60 Second, the
Petitioners postulated a border war with Mexico over straying broadcast
signals that might lead to chilled speech in this country. The supreme
court acknowledged these concerns as an abstract matter but didn’t ac-
cept their contextual relevance:
We hold that Texas courts have jurisdiction over Petitioners not be-
cause their broadcast signals “strayed” and “crossed national bound-
aries,” but because some evidence establishes that Petitioners
intentionally targeted Texas with those broadcasts and thereby pur-
posefully availed themselves of the benefits of Texas laws. Requiring
nonresidents to comply with the laws of the jurisdictions in which
they choose to do business is not unreasonable, burdensome, or
unique.61
C. OTHER COURTS
A number of other courts confirmed or clarified some finer points of
personal jurisdiction:
• A preponderance standard applies when a court holds an evidentiary
hearing.62
56. Id. at 49–50.
57. Id. at 50.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 52.
60. Id. at 55 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag-
azine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984)).
61. Id. at 56.
62. Bonner v. Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 661 F. App’x 820, 821 (5th Cir. 2016).
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• Discovery is unwarranted when the plaintiff has no credible docu-
ments demonstrating contacts with the forum.63
• An email exchange initiated by the plaintiff is insufficient to estab-
lish minimum contacts.64
• A forum selection clause is irrelevant where the plaintiff has no cred-
ible evidence of a contract.65
• Actions taken to cloud title in Texas are sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction.66
• Voluntary travel to Texas for the purpose of soliciting business is suf-
ficient to confer personal jurisdiction.67
• The fiduciary shield doctrine does not insulate individuals from juris-
diction over intentional torts.68
• Substitute service on the Secretary of State is insufficient when the
Secretary is provided with the address of the nonresident’s registered
agent rather than the address of the nonresident’s home office.69
• Contacts that are no more than the effects of an alleged conspiracy
are insufficient to confer jurisdiction.70
• Exercise of personal jurisdiction in a proceeding to establish parent-
child relationship is proper where the child is present in Texas other
than through unilateral acts of the mother.71
• Solicitation of a purchase of a retail installment sales contract is suffi-
cient to support jurisdiction when a breach of the purchase agree-
ment is the basis of the claim asserted.72
• Mere existence of an attorney-client relationship with a nonresident
lawyer is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.73
• “Abnormal” control over a subsidiary is required to establish juris-
diction over a parent under an alter-ego theory.74
63. Id. at 822.
64. Id. at 822–23.
65. Id. at 823.
66. Hoskins v. Ricco Family Partners, Ltd., Nos. 02-15-00249-CV, 02-15-00253-CV,
2016 WL 2772164, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
67. Richardson v. MH Outdoor Media, LLC, No. 14-16-00041-CV, 2016 WL 4921104,
at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
68. Id. at *8; Ren v. ANU Res., LLC, 502 S.W.3d 840, 849 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2016, no pet.); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. TFHSP LLC Series 6481, 487 S.W.3d
715, 719–21 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (failure to comply with statutory meth-
ods of service on fiduciary coupled with insufficient pleading to establish jurisdiction).
69. Air Voice Wireless, LLC v. M&E Endeavours LLC, No. 14-15-00548-CV, 2016
WL 5342707, at *4–5 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist] Sept. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
70. Predator Downhole Inc. v. Flotek Indus., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 394, 409 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
71. In re E.H.G., No. 05-15-00439-CV, 2016 WL 4443544, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Aug. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
72. DJRD, LLC v. SKOPOS Fin., LLC, No. 05-16-00072-CV, 2016 WL 3912769, at *4
(Tex. App.—Dallas July 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
73. Mitchell v. Freese & Goss, PLLC, No. 05-15-00868-CV, 2016 WL 3923924, at *5–6
(Tex. App.—Dallas July 15, 2016, pet. filed) (mem.op.).
74. TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Wellshire Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 01-16-00044-CV, 2016
WL 5920776, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 11, 2016, no pet.). But cf. Cor-
nerstone Healthcare Grp. Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Mgmt. VI, L.P., 493 S.W.3d 65, 73 (Tex.
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• Execution of a disputed guarantee is sufficient to establish jurisdic-
tion, even if its existence is later effectively challenged.75
• Evidentiary issues may be waived by omission in an opening brief.76
• Seeking affirmative relief in the trial court may waive a special
appearance.77
• An actual product need not have been sold in Texas to support juris-
diction under a stream-of-commerce theory.78
• Defendant should anticipate a Texas forum where its arbitration
clause selects the federal district of defendant’s residence as the fo-
rum and defendant never establishes another U.S. residence.79
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal ju-
risdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and con-
stitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on
basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law both in state
and federal courts.80 Second, it is a question of forum law.81 Third, the
forum state has broad power to make choice-of-law rules, either legisla-
tively or judicially, subject only to limited constitutional requirements.82
Within the forum state’s control of choice of law is a hierarchy of
choice-of-law rules. At the top are legislative choice-of-law rules, that is,
2016) (“[K]eeping legal entities distinct does not mean they can escape jurisdiction by split-
ting an integrated transaction into bits.”).
75. Rubinstein v. Lucchese, Inc., 497 S.W.3d 615, 632 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016,
no pet.).
76. Phillips Dev. & Realty, LLC v. LJA Eng’g, Inc., 499 S.W.3d 78, 89 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); ERC Midstream LLC v. Am. Midstream Partners,
LP, 497 S.W.3d 99, 107 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
77. Nationwide Distribution Servs., Inc. v. Jones, 496 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
78. See Semperit Technische Produkte Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Hennessy, 508 S.W.3d
569, 576–77 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).
79. Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Haryanto, 491 S.W.3d 337, 346–47 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2016, no pet.).
80. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941).
81. Renvoi—the practice of using another state’s choice-of-law rule—is almost never
employed unless the forum state directs it, and even then, the forum state remains in con-
trol. The Restatement (Second) creates a presumption against renvoi except for limited
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (AM. LAW INST.
1971). Although commentators defend the limited use of renvoi, they acknowledge its gen-
eral lack of acceptance in the United States except in limited circumstances, usually found
in statutes directing the use of renvoi. See PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 162–68
(5th ed. 2010); WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 102–09. Texas law provides for renvoi in speci-
fied sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 1.301(b) (West 2009) (identifying nine sections in which Texas courts must look to the
choice of law rule of another state). For federal courts, Klaxon reiterates the forum state’s
control of choice of law. Klaxon Co., 313 U.S. at 496–97.
82. The Due Process Clause is the primary limit on state choice-of-law rules, requiring
a reasonable or at least minimal connection between the dispute and the applied law. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397, 407–08 (1930); Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 680 (Tex. 2004); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 & cmts. a–f (AM. LAW. INST.
1971).
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statutes directing the application of a certain state’s laws, based on events
or people important to the operation of each specific law.83 Second in the
choice-of-law hierarchy is party-controlled choice of law, that is, choice-
of-law clauses in contracts that control unless public policy dictates other-
wise.84 Third in the hierarchy is the common law, now controlled in Texas
by the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws.85 This Survey article is organized according to this hier-
archy, that is, constitutional, statutory, contractual, and finally common
law under the balancing factors of the most significant relationship test.
In spite of the mix of state and federal cases, readers should note that to
the extent choice of law is a state issue (that is, except for constitutional
issues), the only binding opinions are those of the Texas Supreme
Court.86
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The concept of legislative jurisdiction imposes two territorial limits on
the application of any given law. First is the limit within the law itself, that
is, what territorial range this law was intended to have. Historically, com-
mon law did not have a built-in territorial limit other than the older con-
cept of lex locus at a time when laws were deemed territorial. However,
statutes often have an intended range, and that is the first limit of legisla-
tive jurisdiction—the range imposed by the lawmaker. Within the United
States, the second limit on a law’s range is imposed by the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Similar to the due-process limitation on state long-arm statutes, the
Constitution imposes limits on a state’s ability to choose the governing
law in its courts. Unlike the limits on state long-arm statutes (which arise
only under the due process clause), the choice-of-law limits arise under
several doctrines—due process (requiring a reasonable connection be-
tween the dispute and the governing law); full faith and credit (requiring
the choice-of-law analysis to consider the interests of other affected
states); and to a lesser extent, equal protection, privileges and immuni-
ties, the Commerce Clause, and the Contract Clause.87 Constitutional
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST.
1971); See, e.g., Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1999) (citing TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (West 2008) (applying an earlier version of the Texas
wrongful death statute, requiring that the court “apply the rules of substantive law that are
appropriate under the facts of the case”)).
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)
(Law of the State Chosen by the Parties—allowing contracting parties to choose a gov-
erning law, within defined limits). Texas has adopted section 187. See DeSantis v. Wacken-
hut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677–78 (Tex. 1990).
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)
(listing the seven balancing factors for the most significant relationship test).
86. The exception is when a court rules on a constitutional issue, such as legislative
jurisdiction or full faith and credit. See, e.g., Compaq Comput. Corp., 135 S.W.3d at 680
(legislative jurisdiction); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Chi. Bridge & Iron
Co., 406 S.W.3d 326, 331–32 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. denied) (full faith and
credit).
87. The Due Process Clause is the primary limit on state choice-of-law rules, requiring
a reasonable or at least minimal connection between the dispute and the law being applied.
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problems most often occur when a state court chooses its own law in
questionable circumstances.
Although due process is the more common doctrine, full faith and
credit figured into two Survey period cases, one from the U.S. Supreme
Court and the other from a Texas court of appeals. In Franchise Tax
Board of California v. Hyatt,88 the Supreme Court held that full faith and
credit requires Nevada to give California some aspect of immunity when
sued in a Nevada state court. In the early 1990s Gilbert Hyatt moved
from California to Nevada to avoid California income tax. His move led
to a dispute with the California tax agency—the Franchise Tax Board—
about the effective date of his Nevada residency, which he claimed oc-
curred in September 1991, but which the Tax Board argued was in April
1992. The difference was $10 million in taxes.89 Agents for the Tax Board
gathered evidence on Hyatt, much of it from investigations in Nevada.90
In addition to the Tax Board’s administrative action in California, Hyatt
sued the Tax Board in a Nevada state court, asserting only claims under
Nevada law.91 The Tax Board objected on sovereign immunity grounds.
California law provided full immunity for its own state tax collection ef-
forts while Nevada law merely barred negligence claims against its own
state agents, capped intentional tort damages at $50,000, and barred puni-
tive damages.92 On interlocutory appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court
granted immunity as to the negligence claims but not for the intentional
torts, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.93
On remand, the jury awarded Hyatt $490 million, including $250 mil-
lion in punitive damages. The Nevada Supreme Court reduced that to $1
million (the fraud judgment) but negated the privacy claim as a matter of
law, granted a new trial on emotional distress, and, pertinent to sovereign
immunity, struck the $250 million punitive damages award because Ne-
vada state agencies have such immunity.94 In spite of this Nevada-immu-
nity allowance, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected Tax Board’s
argument that Nevada’s $50,000 damage cap applied. That is (as high-
See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 799; Home Ins. Co., 281 U.S. at 407; Compaq Com-
put. Corp., 135 S.W.3d at 680; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9
and comments following; HAY ET AL., supra note 81, at 175–203; WEINTRAUB, supra note
1, at 585–648; James P. George, Choice of Law: A Guide for Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 833, 844–46 (1994). In addition to these two limits, international law also
imposes a reasonable connection limit on choice of law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402–04 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
88. See 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1279 (2016).
89. Id. at 1279–80.
90. See id. at 1284 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
91. The claims were invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
fraud, breach of confidence, and abuse of process. These claims were based on Tax Board’s
Nevada investigation, which Hyatt alleged included the Tax Board auditor having “peered
through Hyatt’s windows, rummaged around in his garbage, contacted his estranged family
members, and shared his personal information not only with newspapers but also with his
business contacts and even his place of worship.” Id.
92. See id. at 1280.
93. See id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003)).
94. Id. at 1285 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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lighted in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent), the Nevada Supreme Court
applied none of California’s immunity law, and part but not all of Ne-
vada’s immunity law.95 The Nevada Supreme Court justified the bifurca-
tion of its immunity law as public policy—the $50,000 cap was for Nevada
agencies that were under appropriate restraints that California did not
impose on its agents, at least not in investigations done outside
California.96
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the case’s second certiorari and
agreed to decide two issues: (1) should California be granted full immu-
nity from suits in another state’s court?97 and (2) did full faith and credit
require some aspect of Nevada immunity?98 On the first issue, the Su-
preme Court split 4-4 and thus upheld Nevada’s denial of California hav-
ing intrinsic immunity.99 That is, because a state’s immunity from suits in
another state is not addressed in the Eleventh Amendment or otherwise
in the Constitution, the only ground for immunity was that it’s intrinsic to
statehood.100 On the second issue—full faith and credit for sister-states’
sovereign immunity laws—by a 6–2 vote the Supreme Court reversed the
Nevada decision on a finding that Nevada’s application of a “special law”
embodied a policy of hostility to California’s public acts (California’s stat-
utory declaration of its own absolute immunity on tax investigations)
without a sufficient policy justification.101 The special law was Nevada’s
crafting of a partial immunity rule that applied Nevada immunity law to
negate (1) Hyatt’s negligence claims; and (2) Hyatt’s punitive damages,
but allowed unlimited actual damages on the intentional torts. Nevada’s
policy justification was California’s failure to police its tax auditors’ activ-
ities in Nevada, something the dissent found to be adequate but the ma-
jority did not.102
Back home in Texas, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed full
faith and credit in Richardson v. State,103 which is a rare example of the
Restatement (Second)’s application in a criminal case. Richardson was
intoxicated when his elevated truck ran over and crushed a car, resulting
in injuries and one death.104 Following his conviction, the trial court con-
sidered Richardson’s misdemeanor convictions in Iowa for sentencing-en-
hancement purposes. In that consideration the trial court applied Texas
law to characterize the Iowa misdemeanor convictions as felonies.105
95. Id. at 1282 (majority op.); see also id. at 1287–88 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1280.
97. Id. at 1279–80 (this was a reconsideration of Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), in
which the Supreme Court held that a Nevada agency could be sued in a California state
court).
98. Id. at 1280.
99. Id. at 1279.
100. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 418–21.
101. See Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. at 1281–83.
102. See id. at 1282, 1287.
103. See Nos. 02-15-00271-CR, 02-15-00272-CR, 2016 WL 6900901 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Nov. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id. at *7.
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Richardson argued on appeal that the Full Faith and Credit Clause re-
quired the court to define those convictions under Iowa law which would
disqualify them as felony enhancements in Texas.106 The court of appeals
rejected this argument, based on a Texas statute that directed the applica-
tion of Texas law to define convictions from other states.107
In applying the Texas choice of law statute, the court of appeals cited
several authorities for the point that full faith and credit has less applica-
bility to criminal cases than it would if asked to recognize a civil judg-
ment.108 That lesser applicability did not, however, negate Richardson’s
choice of law argument, so the court of appeals went on to consider
whether Texas or Iowa law should control the effect of an Iowa convic-
tion in enhancing a Texas conviction.109 The court of appeals relied here
on Restatement (Second) Section 6 for the point that “[a] court, subject
to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own
state on choice of law.”110 This of course pointed to the primacy of the
Texas criminal statute designating Texas law for assessing sentencing en-
hancement.111 The court of appeals further noted that the issue here was
procedural and quoted Restatement (Second) Section 122 for the point
that forum law controls procedural issues such as this one.112
B. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
Statutory choice-of-law rules express a public policy interest that over-
rides both the common law analysis in the Restatement (Second), and the
party autonomy principle in contract disputes involving a choice-of-law
clause. Some choice-of-law statutes compel the application of Texas law
and some the application of another state’s or nation’s law. In each case,
the application of law is based on a designated event or relationship
deemed paramount.
Oubre v. Schlumberger Limited113 provides a common example under
the Texas wrongful death statute applying to deaths or injuries occurring
out of state. The case involved a refinery accident in Louisiana that in-
jured Oubre, who sued in Texas a year and a day after the accident.114
Defendants moved to dismiss based on Louisiana’s one-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions.115 Oubre argued that Texas law
controlled under a Restatement (Second) Section 145 analysis, based on
defendants’ Texas activities including policy determination and a failure
106. Id.
107. Id. at *7–8 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41 (West 2011)).
108. Id. at *7.
109. Id. at *8.
110. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF
LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. No. 3:15-CV-111, 2016 WL 5334627 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2016).
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id.
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to train employees.116 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas bypassed Oubre’s Restatement (Second) argument and noted that
Texas statutorily controls choice of law in wrongful death and personal
injury actions occurring out of state.117 The Texas statute provides that
personal injury claims from other jurisdictions may be filed here if filed
before time barred under Texas law, and, if plaintiff is not a Texas resi-
dent, the law of the state where the accident occurred.118 The evidence
was conclusive that Oubre’s filing exceeded the time limit under Louisi-
ana law, and the district court issued summary judgment for
defendants.119
In Petrobras America, Inc. v. Vicinay Cadenas, S.A.,120 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the timing for raising a choice
of law issue. The case arose from defendant Vicinay’s negligent manufac-
ture of underwater tether chains that eventually broke, resulting in the
shutdown of oil and gas production and losses of $400 million.121 Pe-
trobas brought the claim in federal court alleging federal maritime juris-
diction over various common law claims without arguing for any other
source of law. Vicinay won by summary judgment under maritime law’s
economic loss doctrine,122 and Petrobas then moved to amend to assert a
claim under Louisiana law, which it argued was mandated by the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),123 a federal choice of law statute
with a test that may point to federal common law or in some cases to the
adjacent state. The district court rejected the choice of law argument as
having been waived by not being raised before summary judgment.124
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Congress mandated OCSLA’s ap-
plication, that it was not waivable either by contract or failure to raise at
trial,125 and that in this case OCSLA pointed to Louisiana law.126 In a
subsequent clarification, the Fifth Circuit noted that this ruling of non-
waivability applied only to OCSLA and not to other choice of law
rules.127
C. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule, Texas courts apply the
most significant relationship test, a seven-factor balancing test from the
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. at *4–5.
118. Id. (citing TEXAS CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.031(a) (West 2008)); see also
Burdett v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, No. 3:15-CV-4038-B, 2016 WL 3745682, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. July 13, 2016) (holding that TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.031 applies to perti-
nent choice-of-law issues in Texas federal courts).
119. Oubre, 2016 WL 5334627, at *7.
120. 815 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2016).
121. See id. at 213.
122. Id. at 214.
123. See id. at 213 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2012)).
124. Id. at 214.
125. Id. at 214–15.
126. Id. at 215–18.
127. See Petrobras Am., Inc. v. Vicinay Cadenas, S.A., 829 F.3d 770, 771 (5th Cir. 2016).
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Restatement. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test is
seven factors to be balanced according to the needs of the particular case.
They are:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (b) the rele-
vant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other inter-
ested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of justified
expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and (g) ease
in the determination and application of the law to be applied.128
This listing is not by priority, which varies from case to case.129
1. Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contracts
Texas law and the Restatement permit contracting parties to choose a
governing law.130 It may be tempting to accept this practice with the idea
that the parties’ choice should be conclusive, especially in the absence of
a party’s objection and opposing argument. The Restatement, however,
makes it clear that parties’ contractual choices of law do not control un-
less (1) the choice bears a reasonable relationship to the dispute; and (2)
the result does not contravene a fundamental interest of a jurisdiction
with a materially greater interest.131 Case law in both Texas132 and fed-
eral133 courts adopt the Restatement’s structured view.
Merritt, Hawkins & Associates, LLC v. Caporicci134 is a good example
of the proper Restatement analysis where the parties’ contract designates
one state’s law but another state has a greater interest—that is, the
court’s rejection of an otherwise valid choice-of-law clause. Merritt was a
second-filed case in a dispute with simultaneous litigation in California.135
Interestingly, it is also a somewhat rare example of an interlocutory ap-
peal of the trial court’s choice-of-law decision, with the merits left to be
decided.136
Merritt is a California limited liability company engaged in employee
recruiting for health care firms, with its primary location in Texas. Two of
its California-based employees left the company in 2013 to start a rival
business in California, leading Merritt to send warning letters to both re-
garding non-compete clauses in their employment contracts.137 The em-
ployees filed suit in California state court seeking various employment-
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
129. Id. at cmt. c.
130. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
132. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677–81.
133. See Int’l Interests, L.P. v. Hardy, 448 F.3d 303, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2006).
134. See generally No. 05-15-00851-CV, 2016 WL 1757251 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 2,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
135. Id. at *1
136. See id.
137. Id.
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related damages and a declaration that the non-compete clauses violated
California law.138 Merritt then filed a parallel action in Texas to which the
employees filed counterclaims.139 The Texas trial court granted the em-
ployees’ request to designate California law as controlling (accomplished
with a motion to take judicial notice), in spite of the Texas choice of law
clause in the employment contracts. Merritt obtained the court’s approval
for the interlocutory appeal.140
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed. Starting the analysis with Re-
statement (Second) Section 187(1), the court of appeals found that Texas
had a substantial connection to the dispute and was an appropriate choice
unless another state had a greater connection under Section 187(2).141
California, however, had a greater connection, and the non-compete
agreement clearly violated California public policy.142 This conclusion ap-
plied to the contract claims only, and the court of appeals did a separate
analysis for both sides’ tort claims. California law prevailed again under
Restatement (Second) Sections 6 and 145 with the greater quality of con-
tacts in California.143
Western-Southern Life Assurance Co. v. Kaleh144 was a collection ac-
tion against defendant-guarantor Kaleh when he failed to repay a loan for
the development of an apartment complex in Houston. The issue was
which of two choice-of-law clauses controlled. The loan guarantees had
an Ohio choice of law clause while the amended loan documents had a
Texas choice of law clause.145 The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas found that the earlier contract’s clause (choosing Ohio)
applied because the action was on the guarantees and “the Amended
Loan Documents did not alter the Guarantees’ terms.”146 Having deter-
mined that Ohio law governed the merits, there remained an issue of
which law governed defendant Kaleh’s limitations defense. Kaleh had ar-
gued that Texas had an applicable two-year period,147 and plaintiff coun-
tered that the Ohio choice of law clause applied both to substance and
procedure.148 The district court readily rejected this, noting the phenome-
non that statutes of limitations can be procedural or substantive, but that
they’re presumed to be procedural (and thus controlled by forum law)
unless the limitations period is built into the controlling substantive
law.149 In this case, Ohio law did not include a limitations period in the




141. Id. at *2.
142. Id. at *3–4 (the court of appeals relied in part on DeSantis, the bellwether Texas
opinion on choice-of-law clause analysis and coincidentally a non-compete case).
143. Id. at *5.
144. 193 F. Supp. 3d 756 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
145. Id. at 762.
146. Id. at 770.
147. Id. at 773.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 771.
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period applied.150 That result did not help defendant’s limitations objec-
tion because the district court further found that the appropriate Texas
limitations period was four years, thus validating plaintiff’s timely
filing.151
Connell v. Wells Fargo & Co.152 is an attempted class action to set aside
defendant’s non-compete clauses in employment contracts with its finan-
cial advisors. Plaintiffs argued that the employment contracts’ designation
of North Carolina law should be rejected because it violated Texas public
policy.153 In applying North Carolina law to dismiss the claims, Judge Ro-
senthal provided a concise-but-thorough analysis under Restatement
(Second) Section 187 that recognized the contracts’ valid choice of North
Carolina law (based on the reasonable basis for selecting that law) and
the governing law’s non-violation of a fundamental Texas policy.154
2. Contracts Not Designating a Governing Law
This Survey period produced one notable contract case not involving a
choice-of-law clause, contrasted with the seven cases discussed in the Sur-
vey ten years ago.155 Two reasons for the disparity come to mind, one
good, one bad, neither provable. The good reason is that more contracts
now include choice-of-law clauses. The bad reason is that parties litigating
multi-jurisdictional claims on contracts lacking law clauses often do not
consider raising a choice-of-law issue. The lone case this Survey period is
an example of the latter, and the court went out of its way to justify Texas
law’s application. Glycobiosciences, Inc. v. Woodfield Pharmaceutical,
LLC156 was an action for breach of a confidentiality agreement regarding
the manufacture of pain relievers. The parties’ contract lacked a choice-
of-law clause, the parties did not raise the issue in their pleadings, and the
parties cited only Texas law in their briefs.157 This is enough to waive the
argument for any other governing law,158 but instead the U.S. District
150. Id. at 774–75.
151. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(3) (West 2002)). In
Exco Res., Inc. v. Cudd Pressure Control Inc., No. 05-14-01364-CV, 2016 WL 2726539, at
*5–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 9, 2016, no pet.), the court of appeals dealt with the same
issue—conflicting choice of law clauses—this time in an indemnity claim. The parties’ rela-
tionship was centered on two agreements—a master services agreement for oilfield opera-
tions (choosing Texas law) and a separate indemnity agreement choosing Louisiana law.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the more specific indemnity
agreement controlled over the larger agreement, and then confirmed that holding under a
Restatement (Second) analysis. Id.
152. No. H-15-2841, 2016 WL 4733448 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2016).
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id. at *3–4.
155. See James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 60 SMU L. REV. 817,
826–27 (2007).
156. No. 4:15-CV-02109, 2016 WL 1702674 (S.D. Tex. April 27, 2016).
157. Id. at *3.
158. In addition to the permissibility of following the parties’ briefed law, the court
could have added that forum law applies unless a party meets the burden of pleading and
proving the applicability of another. See Excess Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v.
Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 42, 53 (Tex. 2008); see also George,
supra note 87, at 848.
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Court for the Southern District of Texas first noted the presumption of
following the parties’ sole references to Texas law,159 then turned to a
proper Restatement (Second) analysis under Section 188 and found that
Texas law would govern based on the facts known.160
3. Torts
Choice of law in tort cases is directed by Restatement Section 145, a
four-factor test prioritizing (1) the injury situs; (2) the conduct situs; (3)
the parties’ domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business; and (4) the situs of the parties’ relationship, if any.161
Section 145 is augmented by forty additional tort sections addressing spe-
cific claims such as fraud,162 or issues common to torts such as standard of
care.163
EH National Bank v. Tran164 was an action for legal malpractice re-
garding a land purchase in Montana. Plaintiff was a California bank that
agreed to finance the purchase of the Montana land by Blue Vault, LLC,
a Wyoming company. Defendants were Texas attorney Tran and his
Texas-based law firm, hired by plaintiff to prepare the transaction docu-
ments.165 Blue Vault tendered a bad check for the $750,000 down pay-
ment and when it defaulted, the bank sued Tran and his firm in a
Montana state court for failing to verify the check’s validity.166 Defend-
ants removed to federal court in Montana and then objected to personal
jurisdiction there. The Montana district court found in defendants’ favor
but rather than dismiss, it transferred the action to the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas.167 In Texas, defendants moved to des-
ignate Erika Rae Brown (who’d been sentenced to prison in regard to the
transaction) as a responsible third party. Plaintiff bank objected on the
grounds that Montana law, which did not allow such joinder, should con-
trol.168 The district court applied Restatement (Second) Sections 6 and
145 to find that Texas law controlled the procedural issue of party
joinder.169
159. Glycobiosciences, Inc., 2016 WL 1702674, at *3.
160. Id.
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
162. Id. § 148.
163. Id. § 157.
164. No. 3:16-CV-00083-M, 2016 WL 4138634 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2016).
165. Id. at *1.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *2.
169. Id. at *4. Plaintiff also argued that Montana law applied because it was designated
in the pertinent loan agreement, but the district court rejected this because defendant at-
torneys were not parties to the loan agreement. Id. at *5. Plaintiff also argued that Mon-
tana choice-of-law rules governed because Texas was a transferee court. The district court
rejected this as well, pointing that that the transferee rule applied only for inconvenient
forum transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, and this was a jurisdictional transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1631. Id. On that point, see Sims v. Kia Motors of Am., Inc., 839 F.3d 393, 399–400
(5th Cir. 2016) (court applied California choice-of-law rule in wrongful death case because
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In other tort actions, federal district courts in Texas (1) held that
Vietnamese law applied to a business fraud claim for activities in Vietnam
in spite of the district court’s denial of motions to dismiss on jurisdictional
and inconvenient forum grounds;170 (2) noted that in multi-district litiga-
tion procedures, the district court must apply the choice of law rules of
each state of origin;171 and (3) denied dispositive motions in a trade
secrets case involving Canadian parties because both sides failed to artic-
ulate the necessary elements under Restatement (Second) Section 145 for
tort claims.172
4. Family Law
Three Survey period cases raise choice of law in family-related cases,
which is somewhat unusual. Bauer v. White173 was an interpleader case
filed by Etoco to resolve conflicting inheritance claims to oil and gas roy-
alties in Texas. W.A. Gillam was born in Nebraska in 1913 and apparently
lived there his entire life. After his first wife’s death, he married Mae
Gillan in Nebraska in 1937. In 1950, while still living in Nebraska, W.A.
acquired an undivided half interest in a 271.5-acre tract in Texas. He later
sold a one-eighth interest and retained three-eighths of the property.
When W.A. died in Nebraska in 1963, his will allotted a one-third interest
to wife Mae and two-thirds to his three children by his first wife.174 In
spite of the Nebraska probate following W.A.’s death, the Texas royalty
issue did not reach litigation for several decades when Etoco filed the
Texas interpleader in 2009, seeking resolution as to which groups of
heirs—the first wife’s or the second wife’s—had which interest.175 The
answer rested on which state’s law governed marital property.176 The first
wife’s heirs claimed that the mineral interests were separate property at
the time W.A. married Mae, while Mae’s heirs argued that the Texas min-
eral interests were her community property. If community property, the
first wife’s heirs would lose half their share.
The trial court rendered a summary judgment for the first wife’s heirs,
finding that the Texas property was decedent’s separate property under
Nebraska law.177 Mae’s heirs appealed, arguing that Texas law controlled
it was an inconvenient forum transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, based on location of evi-
dence and witnesses).
170. Viet. Land v. Tran, No. H-14-957, 2016 WL 1085101, at *1–3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18,
2016) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 145, 156 (AM. LAW INST.
1971)).
171. In re Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., Greek Yogurt Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., 163
F. Supp. 3d 385, 388–89 (W.D. Tex. 2016).
172. PCM Sales, Inc. v. Quadbridge, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-2806-L, 2016 WL 407300, at
*5–6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2016).
173. No. 13-16-00054-CV, 2016 WL 3136608 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 2, 2016,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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and it was community property.178 Texas law controlled because the char-
acter of Texas land is governed by Texas law.179 Texas law is that the
community-property nature of land is determined by the source of the
funds used to purchase the land—if the property was purchased with
W.A.’s non-community funds, then it remained separate property.180 Fur-
ther, there is a presumption about acquiring Texas property: where there
is any indication that community funds could have been used to purchase
the Texas property, then the Texas property is presumptively commu-
nity.181 That presumption has exceptions, though, and this case raises one
because W.A. lived in Nebraska his entire life.182 This defeated the pre-
sumption of Texas community property but did not compel the conclu-
sion as to the property’s character.183 The first wife’s heirs won at trial on
summary judgment, which the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held was
inappropriate because the first wife’s heirs failed to negate the possibility
that the purchase funds came from Nebraska separate property (in spite
of the presumption favoring that).184 Thus, there was a fact issue for trial
on remand.185
Cutler v. Cutler186 is the application of the Restatement to determine
which state’s law governs the validity of a marriage ceremony. Ernest
Cutler and Teresita Martell began living together in Florida and married
there in 2002, although at the time of the Florida ceremony the husband
was married to another woman. Martell left him at that point, but Cutler
obtained a divorce from the prior wife and Martell resumed the relation-
ship with him.187 They moved to Texas and held themselves out as mar-
ried, but the relationship eventually failed and Martell filed for divorce.
Cutler counterclaimed to seek division of what he claimed was marital
property, and Martel amended her petition to seek a declaration that the
marriage was void. The trial court ruled for Cutler, finding that under
Texas law the parties’ relationship ripened into a common law marriage
after Cutler’s divorce.188 The trial court apparently applied a Texas
choice-of-law statute which directs that Texas “law applies to persons
married elsewhere who are domiciled in this state.”189 The San Antonio
Court of Appeals reversed in Martell’s favor, finding that (1) the Texas
statute did not apply to the parties at the time they lived outside Texas;
(2) under Restatement (Second) Sections 6 and 283, Florida law gov-
178. Id.
179. Id. at *2 (citing Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333,
341 (Tex. 2009)).
180. Id. at *2–3.
181. See id. at *2.
182. Id. at *3–4.
183. Id. at *4.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *4–5.
186. No. 04-15-00693-CV, 2016 WL 4444418 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 24, 2016,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
187. Id. at *1.
188. Id. at *1–2.
189. Id. at *2 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.103 (West 2006)).
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erned that period; and (3) Florida law did not recognize common law
marriage and the parties thus were never married in Florida.190 The trial
court had not considered the parties’ marital status based on later events
in Texas, and because there was some evidence to support a finding of
common law marriage in Texas, the court of appeals remanded the case
to determine if the parties assumed a common law relationship in
Texas.191
Di Angelo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.192 illustrates the importance of
considering choice of law at the case’s outset. Although the action was for
negligence against a bank, the underlying case was probate, which raised
the unusual instance of federal trial and appellate courts applying probate
laws. Di Angelo sued Wells Fargo for wrongfully disbursing her deceased
father’s bank account to her stepmother. Her father and brother died
while attempting to climb K2 on the China-Pakistan border. Her father’s
New Zealand will left Di Angelo the money in the Wells Fargo bank ac-
count.193 Di Angelo notified the bank’s Houston branch and asked them
to place a hold on the account but the bank declined because of the de-
posit’s large size. Instead, the bank assured her that no one could with-
draw the funds without proof of the depositor’s death. When Di Angelo
returned later with the death certificate, the bank had given the money to
her stepmother.194 Di Angelo sued in a Texas state court and the bank
removed to federal court, which granted summary judgment for the bank
based on the California probate code.195 On appeal, Di Angelo argued
that Texas law applied instead of California law, but the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that she’d waived her argument by con-
ceding the application of California law at the summary judgment
stage.196
D. OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES
1. The Role of Choice of Law in Forum Challenges
During the Survey period, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rendered three decisions applying choice of law analyses to forum
clauses and forum non conveniens. Weber v. Pact GSPP Technologies,
AG197 is the most notable of the three for its resolution of a question of
first impression flowing from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atlan-
tic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court.198 PACT is an intellec-
tual property licensing and enforcement company formed in Germany
but with its early operations mostly in the United States. Weber joined
190. Id. at *2–3.
191. Id. at *3–4.
192. 820 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 2016).
193. Id. at 807–08.
194. Id. at 808.
195. Id. (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 13106(a) (West 1991)).
196. Id. at 808.
197. 811 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2016).
198. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
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the board in 2002, was elected chairman in 2003, and became chief execu-
tive officer in 2004. He did so without pay under an agreement that he’d
be paid when the company became profitable.199 Weber claimed that he
directed a successful patent infringement suit in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas, and that soon after the 2012 verdict but
before the 2013 judgment, the PACT board voted him out. When PACT
refused his compensation demand, Weber sued PACT in a federal court
in Texas. Two days later PACT sued in Germany, seeking a declaration
that Weber’s compensation agreement was invalid because it lacked
shareholder approval required under German law.200 PACT moved to
dismiss the Texas case based on Weber’s employment contract’s designa-
tion of a German forum.201 The contract was in German and the transla-
tion was disputed. It had been negotiated in both California (where
Weber signed) and in Germany (where the company agent signed).202
PACT’s expert witness testified that the clause was mandatory, and fur-
ther that applicable German choice of law principles (not the contract
itself) dictated the application of German law.203
In deciding PACT’s motion to dismiss, the Fifth Circuit had to address
unanswered questions from Atlantic Marine’s clarification (and resolution
of a circuit split) on the proper procedure when faced with a derogating-
forum clause, that is, where plaintiff sues in a forum contrary to a con-
tractually-agreed forum. The resulting Atlantic Marine procedure is for
the court to (1) determine if the forum clause is mandatory; and if so (2)
conduct a forum non conveniens analysis with an eye toward the parties
having conceded the acceptability of the contractually-chosen forum.204
Atlantic Marine left open at least two questions. First, what is the stan-
dard of review on appeal? Prior to Atlantic Marine, the Fifth Circuit used
de novo review for dismissals or transfers based on forum clauses.205 The
court noted that although Atlantic Marine changed the analytical struc-
199. Weber, 811 F.3d at 763.
200. Id. at 763–64.
201. Id. at 764 (the agreement lacked a choice-of-law clause, but PACT’s expert on
German law testified that under German law, a forum clause was an implicit choice of the
chosen forum’s law).
202. Id. at 763 (the forum clause read: “Soweit gesetzlich zula¨ssig, ist Gerichsstand und
Erfullungsort der Sitz der PACT AG.” The dispute was on the word “sitz,” which Weber
argued meant residence (arguably the United States at the contract’s formation), while
PACT argued it meant “corporate seat” (which was Germany).
203. See id. at 764 (citing Regulation 864/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40(EC); Regulation
593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6(EC)) (the expert’s testimony was based on European Union
law and various treaty-based regulations).
204. Id. at 766–67 (citing Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of
Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 n.6 (2013); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6
(1981)). In routine forum non conveniens analyses (those lacking forum clauses), a district
court applies the public and private balancing factors outlined in Piper Aircraft Co. But in
cases involving mandatory forum clauses, because the parties have chosen an exclusive
forum, Atlantic Marine holds that the parties have conceded the acceptability of the chosen
forum, and as a result, the private-interest factors do not apply.
205. Id. at 767 (citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257) (noting that ordinary forum non
conveniens dismissals (those lacking mandatory forum clauses) were reviewed for abuse of
discretion).
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ture, it had not identified the standard of review.206 The Fifth Circuit an-
swered that question with a two-fold standard: “We review the district
court’s interpretation of the FSC and its assessment of that clause’s en-
forceability de novo, then we review for abuse of discretion the court’s
balancing of the private- and public-interest factors.”207
The second question from Atlantic Marine was what laws govern vari-
ous stages of the analysis. The Fifth Circuit noted the disparity in federal
opinions, with many applying federal common law as the choice-of-law
rule to determine if the contract’s chosen law (if any) should govern, or
some other state’s law.208 The Fifth Circuit noted the same two issues as
with the standard of appellate review: (1) which law governs interpreta-
tion; and (2) which law governs enforceability. The Fifth Circuit held that
instead of federal common law, the forum state’s choice-of-law rules ap-
plied to interpret the forum clause.209
Applying that to the case, Texas choice-of-law rules confirmed that the
contract’s designated German law controlled the forum clause’s interpre-
tation.210 Once the clause is interpreted, its enforceability is a matter of
federal common law,211 which brings the analysis back to Atlantic Marine.
Under that analysis, PACT won, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s dismissal for litigation in Germany.212
Barnett v. DynCorp. International, L.L.C.213 considered what law gov-
erns limitations periods in employment contracts with forum clauses,
where the chosen forum would dismiss the claim. Plaintiff worked in Ku-
wait and later sued in a Texas federal court for unpaid wages in a putative
class action. The employment contract had choice-of-forum and choice-
206. Id.
207. Id. at 768.
208. Id. at 770–71.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 771–73 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 188
(AM. LAW INST. 1971)).
211. Id. at 770 (citing Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962 (5th Cir. 1997)).
212. Id. at 773–76. Two federal district courts in Texas applied Weber during the Survey
period. Sabal Ltd. LP v. Deutsche Bank AG was an investor’s action against a bank for
breach of contract and conversion. The underlying agreements had inconsistent forum
clauses, both choosing New York as the forum, but the first mandatory and the second
permissive. The mandatory clause would trigger an Atlantic Marine analysis favoring trans-
fer, but the permissive clause would warrant transfer only under a stricter forum non con-
veniens analysis. Citing Weber, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
used Texas choice-of-law rules to determine that the contract’s chosen New York law gov-
erned interpretation, used New York law to determine the primacy of the mandatory
clause, then used federal common law under Atlantic Marine to validate the forum clause’s
enforceability, resulting in the action’s transfer to the Southern District of New York. Sabal
Ltd. LP v. Deutsche Bank AG, 209 F. Supp. 3d 907, 919–25 (W.D. Tex 2016). The second
case is DBS Solutions LLC v. Infovista Corp., No. 3:15-CV-03875-M, 2016 WL 3926505, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 2016), an action on a contract designating French law as controlling
and pointing to litigation in the Paris Commercial Court. Citing Weber, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas used Texas choice-of-law rules to determine that
the contract’s choice of French law was valid, interpreted the clause under French law, and
found it enforceable under federal common law as detailed in Atlantic Marine’s forum non
conveniens formula. DBS Solutions, 2016 WL 3926505, at *2–4.
213. 831 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2016).
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of-law clauses designating Kuwait, and the trial court dismissed based on
that forum clause.214 On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Kuwait forum
clause was statutorily void under Texas law.215 In spite of this, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismis-
sal based on Kuwait law, noting that the parties’ chosen law governs un-
less it violates a “‘strong’ or ‘fundamental’ public policy of Texas.”216 The
Fifth Circuit found that it did not.217
Nabors Completion & Production Services Co. v. Chesapeake Operat-
ing, Inc.,218 is the application of judicial estoppel where a party failed to
argue choice of law in the lower court. Nabors filed an indemnity claim
for a fire that resulted from two blown tires on a tank it was hauling in
Oklahoma for Chesapeake. Nabors also had a claim for contribution re-
lated to claims against Nabors by a landowner whose property was dam-
aged by the fire.219 The district court granted a summary judgment to
defendants on both the indemnity and the contribution claims, and
Nabors appealed. As to the contribution claim, Nabors argued that
Oklahoma law controlled as the accident situs.220 Nabors lost on two
grounds. First, when defendant had earlier moved for an inconvenient
forum transfer to the Western District of Oklahoma, Nabors had argued
that the case should stay in Texas to be tried by a court familiar with
Texas law, which, Nabors argued, governed this case.221 Second, Nabors
failed to brief the forum state’s choice-of-law rules that would lay the
predicate for applying Oklahoma law.222
2. The Use of Another State’s Choice-of-Law Rule
ADP, LLC v. Capote223 was a suit to enforce non-compete and non-
disclosure agreements, filed in New Jersey but, on defendant’s motion,
transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.
The employment contract designated New Jersey law and the district
court found it enforceable under a proper 187 analysis—the chosen state
had a relationship with the dispute and no other state had a materially
greater interest and public policy that would be impacted if the chosen
law applied.224 Applying New Jersey law to the merits, there were two
pertinent claims: (1) non-disclosure, which the chosen New Jersey law
214. Id. at 299–300.
215. Id. at 300–01 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.070 (West 2015)) (voiding
“any stipulation, contract, or agreement that establishes a limitations period that is shorter
than two years”).
216. Id. at 303.
217. See id. at 303–09.
218. See 648 F. App’x 393 (5th Cir. 2016).
219. Id. at 394–95.
220. Id. at 397.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 397–98.
223. No. A-15-CA-714-SS, 2016 WL 3742319 (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2016).
224. Id. at *2 (citing DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Tex. 1990)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187(2) (AM. LAW INST.
1971))).
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governed because applying that law did not violate a fundamental Texas
interest;225 and (2) the non-compete agreement, which Texas law gov-
erned because New Jersey law violated a fundamental Texas policy.226
This analysis is proper on its face except that Texas choice-of-law rules
may not apply. The opinion recites a transfer from the District of New
Jersey to the Western District of Texas but does not identify the transfer-
ring statute. According to the case’s Docket Item No. 14, the transfer was
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1404,227 which requires the transferee court in Texas
to apply the transferring court’s choice-of-law rule,228 which is the New
Jersey rule.229
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Final judgments from other states, territories, and countries create
Texas conflict-of-laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement; and
(2) their preclusive effect on local lawsuits.
A. SISTER-STATE JUDGMENTS
The Survey period offered several routine-but-instructive judgment en-
forcements from sister states or territories under the Uniform Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA).230 Liberty Sport Aviation, L.P.
v. Texas Hill Country Bank231 is an example of a non-party intervening to
contest possession of property awarded by a sister-state judgment. Lib-
erty Sport Aviation obtained a Pennsylvania judgment for the foreclosure
on an aircraft that had been used as security for a loan. Liberty Sport
Aviation filed that judgment in Texas to obtain possession, along with a
fraudulent transfer action because the debtor had sold the aircraft to
PFM Group LLC. Texas Hill Country Bank intervened, seeking a decla-
ration that its security interest in the aircraft (for a line of credit to PFM)
was superior to that created by the loan in Pennsylvania or the resulting
Pennsylvania judgment.232 The bank won, based on the San Antonio
Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the original debtor’s fraudulent crea-
tion of the bank’s security interest did not defeat its superiority under
225. Id. at *2–4.
226. Id. at *4–6.
227. ADP, LLC v. Capote, No. 15–1355 (JLL) (JAD), at 5, 13 (D.N.J. July 28, 2015)
(letter order of United States Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Dickson transferring venue to
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas) (on file with SMU Law Review
Association).
228. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
229. The New Jersey choice-of-law rules draw heavily from the Restatement (Second)
but use more emphasis on government-interest analysis. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins.
of Wausau, 712 A.2d 634, 642 (N.J. 1998); see also HAY ET AL., supra note 81, at 115 n.10
and accompanying text. New Jersey’s rule is likely to have led to the same result, but that
can’t be known without making a supporting record and doing the analysis.
230. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001–.008 (West 2015).
231. No. 04-15-00480-CV, 2016 WL 4626238 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Sept. 7, 2016,
pet. filed) (mem. op.).
232. Id. at *1.
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Texas law.233
Sargeant v. Al Saleh234 is a similar fact setting where judgment-related
assets were transferred to avoid collection on a Florida judgment. Al
Saleh obtained a $28.8 million judgment in Florida against Sargeant and
others for breaching an agreement regarding shipment of fuel to Ameri-
can troops in Iraq. Two days before the Florida judgment, Sargeant trans-
ferred assets to BTB Refining, LLC (BTB), a Texas entity. Al Saleh filed
the Florida judgment for domestication in Texas, along with a fraudulent-
transfer action against BTB under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fer Act.235 Pending the final decision, the district court issued a tempo-
rary asset-freezing injunction to prevent BTB’s disposal of the assets.236
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed that the trial court was not only
authorized to issue the injunction but did not abuse its discretion in doing
so.237
Thompson v. Florida Wood Treaters, Inc.238 involved a judgment from
the U.S. Virgin Islands raising questions of the territorial court’s author-
ity to enter a final judgment under the UEFJA. Florida Wood Treaters
(Wood Treaters) foreclosed on liens against the Thompsons’ property
which led to a money judgment for post-foreclosure indebtedness. When
Wood Treaters domesticated the Virgin Islands judgment in Texas, the
Thompsons objected that the rendering court in the Virgin Islands lacked
authority as a non-Article III federal court, and that the judgment wasn’t
final because of the additional parties and claims.239 The Texas trial court
held in favor of Wood Treaters, and the Dallas Court of Appeals af-
firmed, finding that the territorial court had authority240 and that the Vir-
gin Islands judgment was final and properly rendered.241
Other Survey period cases discussed (1) enforcing a Massachusetts de-
fault judgment where the appellant Collins failed to file a motion to set
aside the default even though default judgments are inherently suspect;242
(2) authenticating foreign judgments in light of current e-filing technol-
ogy in Texas;243 and (3) appealing a state district court’s approval of a
233. See id. at *2–8.
234. 512 S.W.3d 399 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi, Jan. 28, 2016, orig. proceeding).
235. Id. at 403, 411.
236. See id. at 406–07, with continuing analysis at 410–15.
237. Id. at 410–11.
238. No. 05-15-00417-CV, 2016 WL 3137536 (Tex. App.—Dallas, June 6, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
239. Id. at *1–2.
240. Id. at *4.
241. Id. at *2–4. The Texas court analyzed whether the summary judgment order by the
District Court for the Virgin Islands had properly disposed of all claims such that it was a
final judgment and whether the final judgment was void since it included relief that was not
requested.
242. See Collins v. Schonau-Riedweg, No. 09-15-00212-CV, 2016 WL 2766058, at *1
(Tex. App.—Beaumont May 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
243. See Ferguson v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 06-15-00054-CV, 2016 WL 3356743, at *1,
*3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 16, 2016, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 902(1)).
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foreign judgment.244
B. FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENTS
Texas enforces judgments from foreign countries that award or deny a
sum of money and meet other criteria listed in the Uniform Foreign
Country Money Judgment Recognition Act (UFCMJRA).245 DeJoria v.
Maghreb Petroleum Exploration, S.A.246 illustrates defenses to enforce-
ment in a series of legal battles dating back to 2001. The opinion by a
federal magistrate judge added at least one more skirmish. In 1998, Texas
resident DeJoria invested in a Moroccan oil development. When the ven-
ture fell apart in 2001, DeJoria fled Morocco—for his safety according to
him and to avoid fraud prosecution according to the Moroccan authori-
ties.247 Maghreb and another Moroccan entity sued DeJoria in a Moroc-
can court and obtained a $122 million judgment. In turn, DeJoria filed a
pre-emptive action in a Texas state court to block enforcement, seeking a
declaration that the Moroccan judgment did not comply with the UFCM-
JRA.248 The Moroccan judgment-creditors removed the Texas state case
to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which ruled
in DeJoria’s favor, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed, finding specifically that the Moroccan judicial system was ade-
quate, that it granted reciprocity to Texas judgments, and that DeJoria
was subject to personal jurisdiction there.249 A footnote to the appellate
opinion noted that the Fifth Circuit had not addressed two arguments—
public policy and forum non conveniens—because DeJoria had not raised
them on appeal.250 On remand, DeJoria sought reconsideration of his two
unaddressed arguments over Maghreb’s objection that he had waived
them by not raising them on appeal, even though he had raised them
originally in the district court. The district court assigned the question to
the magistrate judge whose opinion recommends in DeJoria’s favor,
which, if accepted by the district court, will deny entry of judgment and
allow DeJoria argument on those two points.251 At the time of this arti-
cle’s drafting, no further action had occurred.
244. See Tayob v. Quarterspot, Inc., No. 05-15-00897-CV, 2016 WL 7163842, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Nov. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). The discussion included how to perfect a
restricted appeal, and what points can be appealed (very few). Id.; see also Johnson v.
Hansen, No. 14-15-01082-CV, 2016 WL 402182, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Feb. 2, 2016, no pet.) (another example of how to perfect an appeal (defendant failed
there)).
245. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001–.008 (West 2015).
246. No. A-13-CV-654-JRN-AWA, 2016 WL 4250488 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2016).
247. Id. at *1.
248. Id. at *2.
249. Id. at *3 (citing DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 373 (5th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016)).
250. Id. (citing DeJoria, 804 F.3d at 384 n.12).
251. Id. at *9.
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C. FAMILY LAW CASES
Although federal courts generally abstain from family cases,252 Sierra
v. Tapasco253 is one exception involving the enforcement of a foreign
child custody order under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction.254 The father was Mexican and the
mother Colombian, and they met in North Carolina where they cohabi-
tated and had a child. The mother was here legally, the father was not.
The father was eventually arrested for domestic violence and given the
choice to leave the United States voluntarily with the possibility of re-
turning later, or be deported. The parties reached an agreement that he
would leave voluntarily, and the mother allowed him to take the child to
visit his family in Mexico.255
The legal dispute was whether that agreement was for a temporary visit
or permanent custody. The mother visited Mexico several times, and the
parties even traveled to Colombia together. When their daughter turned
five, the relationship broke down again. When the father told the mother
she would never be allowed to have possession again, the mother took
her daughter to Houston.256 The father filed an action in Houston for his
daughter’s return, but the one problem was his lack of a custody order
from Mexico or anywhere else. The father won nonetheless by showing
three elements of Hague enforcement: (1) Mexico was the child’s habit-
ual residence;257 (2) he had custodial rights under Mexican law and cus-
tom;258 and (3) he was exercising his custody rights at the time of
removal.259 After rejecting the mother’s defenses to enforcement, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas ordered the child’s
return to father.260
In re Salminen261 started with a Finnish mother’s attempt to collect on
a Finnish child support decree in Texas. The Texas-based father contested
child custody and persuaded the Texas trial court to grant him emergency
custody, modifying the Finnish custody order until further notice.262 The
First Houston Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Texas’s acquisition-
252. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992) (explaining the
greater suitability of state courts for most family matters, but noting exceptions for matters
such as intra-family torts as alleged in that case).
253. No. 4:15-CV-00640, 2016 WL 5402933 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2016), appeal docketed,
No. 16-20660 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2016).
254. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980).
255. Sierra, 2016 WL 5402933, at *1.
256. Id. at *2–3.
257. Id. at *5–6.
258. Id. at *7.
259. Id. at *8.
260. Id. at *8–12. Her defenses included the father’s alleged abuse and criminal activity,
id. at *8–9; crime in Mexico City, id. at *10; and the child’s physical and mental condition,
id. at *10–11.
261. 492 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
262. Id. at 33–36.
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of-child-support jurisdiction did not create child-custody jurisdiction,263
and that the facts did not otherwise justify jurisdiction to modify the Finn-
ish order.264
D. PRECLUSION
Petroleum Workers Union of the Republic of Mexico v. Gomez265 offers
a thirty-year story too complex to be explained in the short space here.
Arriba Limited, a Bahamian oil importer, entered an agreement with the
Petroleum Workers Union in 1984 regarding the shipment of residual oil
to the United States for refinement. In 1985, Arriba sued the Union and
other parties for breach of that agreement, resulting in a Texas default
judgment for $92 million.266 In 1987, the parties reached a new agreement
for refining oil that included a release of the 1986 default judgment. That
venture failed too, leading to more litigation and a judgment that argua-
bly revived the released 1986 default judgment.267 Unrelated to this, the
Mexican government asked the U.S. government to freeze $43 million in
a New York bank that had allegedly been embezzled from the Mexican
government by two of the Union’s officers.268 Arriba filed a garnishment
action in a Texas court against the frozen funds in New York. The parties
negotiated an agreement to resolve the garnishment and all prior claims,
but the Union then sought to avoid the agreement, claiming that the
Union’s negotiators lacked authority.269 In 2006, the United States re-
leased the funds and transferred them to the Mexican government. In
2008, the Union obtained judgment in a Mexican court that voided the
garnishment settlement and Ryerson’s attorney-fee agreement. The
Union then sought recognition for the Mexican judgment in the Texas
court.270 The issue in the Texas court at this point was Arriba’s claim for
specific performance of the Garnishment Agreement and collection on
the 1986 default judgment. Based on jury findings supporting the Gar-
nishment Agreement, the trial court found that Arriba should take noth-
ing in damages but was entitled to enforcement of the 1986 default
judgment.271 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed in a
lengthy opinion addressing a number of issues, two that belong in this
Survey article. First, the court of appeals rejected the Union’s argument
that the Garnishment Agreement was illegal under Mexican law because
the Union failed to prove the applicable Mexican law.272 Second, the
court of appeals held that the Mexican judgment was not entitled to rec-
263. Id. at 38 (citing In re M.I.M., 370 S.W.3d 94, 97 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet.
denied), and other cases).
264. Id. at 39–42.
265. 503 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
266. Id. at 16–17.
267. Id. at 17.
268. Id. at 17–18.
269. Id. at 18–19.
270. Id. at 19.
271. Id. at 19–20.
272. Id. at 20–22, 31–34 (quoting and discussing TEX. R. EVID. 203).
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ognition and preclusion in the Texas case because plaintiffs had no notice
of the Mexican action and the Union failed to raise it at trial.273
In Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,274 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit analyzed the preclusive effect of a California state-
court class action on a subsequent federal claim. Preclusion was not a
straightforward procedure because of the circuitous route with the Cali-
fornia litigation. The original California state action was removed to fed-
eral court, which certified a class only to be reversed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On remand to the California federal court,
plaintiffs sought class certification again and were denied.275 In the
meantime, the parties reached a settlement agreement that resulted in
another state court filing to finalize that agreement, resulting in a Califor-
nia judgment in 2011.276 The California settlement released plaintiffs’
claims, including those under the Fair Labor Standards Act.277 Class
members received a notice that included a claim form they had to submit
in order to receive their portion of the $19 million settlement.278
The dispute was not over, though. In Texas, defendants’ employees
filed a related action in federal court under the Fair Labor Standards
Act,279 representing a class that included 1,516 class members from the
California action (the California plaintiffs) along with additional class
members.280 After the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas certified two collective actions, the parties reached a settlement
that excluded the California plaintiffs, against whom the Texas district
court issued a summary judgment based on the preclusive effect of the
California judgment.281
On appeal, several issues figured into the preclusion analysis. One was
the opt-in nature of the federal class action in Texas as opposed to the
opt-out feature of the California class action.282 A second was the ques-
tionable finality of the California case, where appeals were still pending—
the Fifth Circuit held those appeals didn’t relate to the settlement and
were irrelevant to finality.283 A third issue was the effect on 233 Califor-
nia plaintiffs who did not file claim forms and arguably did not opt in—
the Fifth Circuit found that failing to submit a claim form was not the
same as opting out.284 The Fifth Circuit resolved all these issues in de-
fendants’ favor, along with a due process issue unrelated to preclusion,285
273. Id. at 22–26.
274. 839 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2016).
275. Id. at 445 (citing In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 268 F.R.D.
604, 606–09, 614 (N.D. Cal. 2010)).
276. Id. at 445–46.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 445.
279. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012 & Supp. II 2014).
280. Richardson, 839 F.3d at 444–45.
281. Id. at 448.
282. Id. at 451–52.
283. Id. at 452.
284. Id. at 452–53.
285. Id. at 454–55.
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and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment.286 It is also worth
noting that California’s preclusion law governed the preclusive effect of
the California decision in the Texas federal court.287
Wills v. Arizon Structures Worldwide, L.L.C.288 was a contract dispute
over the sale of Arizon’s air structures to a shrimp producer, Global Blue
Technologies-Cameron, LLC (GBT). When Arizon sued GBT and other
parties in a Missouri state court, GBT moved to dismiss in deference to
an arbitration agreement. The Missouri court disagreed and issued an or-
der staying arbitration that was upheld on appeal in Missouri.289 Wills
and Salmon (GBT employees and parties in the Missouri suit) sued in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking an order
compelling arbitration. Arizon (Missouri plaintiff, defendant in Texas)
moved to dismiss the Texas action based on the preclusive effect of the
Missouri order staying arbitration. The Texas district court agreed that
the Missouri ruling was preclusive and dismissed the Texas action.290 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Wills
and Salmon (plaintiffs in Texas) were not in privity with GBT (who lost
the Missouri arbitration ruling), enabling Wills and Salmon to pursue
their anti-arbitration claim in Texas.291
286. Id. at 455.
287. See id. at 449.
288. 824 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2016).
289. Id. at 543–44.
290. Id. at 544–45.
291. Id. at 547.
